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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
My interest in the issues presented in this case stems from my career in labor law, as well
as my research that specifically addresses the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board)
regulation of electronic communications. Following four years as an attorney in the NLRB’s
Appellate Court Branch, I have taught and researched labor and employment law for over fourteen
years.
My research includes several pieces related to the questions at issue in this case. I have
explored the important role that communications play in ensuring employees’ ability to exercise
their statutory right to engage in collective action, as well as the potential conflicts between
employees’ communications and employers’ property interests. See Communication Breakdown:
Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1091 (2011); Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV.
891 (2006). More specifically, I have written extensively on the NLRB’s regulation of electronic
communications. See Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 921 (2015);
E-Mail and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies: The NLRB’s Register Guard Decision, in WORKPLACE
PRIVACY: HERE

AND

ABROAD—PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 61ST ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Jonathan Nash ed., 2010); The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008). I also submitted an amicus brief in Purple
Communications, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 1050 (2014). Much of this brief is derived from the foregoing
work.

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Like other government agencies, the National Labor Relations Board is frequently called
upon to interpret its governing statute. Especially with a statute as vague as the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or Act), there is a great deal of leeway to make such interpretations and their
accompanying policy judgments. As a result, in the vast majority of NLRB cases, there can be
reasonable disagreements about the outcome. This is not one of those cases.
Unlike the usual NLRB policy reversals that occur following a change in the presidential
administration, the issue in this case is cabined by clear precedent from the Supreme Court and
basic property law. Consequently, although Board Members may have sincere disagreements
about what the best outcome should be, the governing law points in only one direction.
In Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NL.R.B. 1050 (2014), the NLRB set forth a new
analysis covering employees’ use of employer-provided email. Under this analysis, which is based
on the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945), the Board presumes that employees who have access to their employer’s email as part of
their work duties can use that email for Section 7 purposes during nonwork time.

Purple

Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063. The employer can rebut this presumption by showing
that special business circumstances justify additional restrictions on employees’ email use. Id. In
contrast to the Board’s prior rule, the Purple Communications presumption is fully consistent with
the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent.
The Purple Communications analysis replaced the Board’s previous approach to email
communications, as set forth in Guard Publishing Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110
(2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This reversal
was appropriate and necessary because Register Guard was indefensible under current law. By
providing employers almost unfettered authority to prohibits employees’ use of email for Section
2

7 purposes, Register Guard directly conflicted with Republic Aviation and the Court’s subsequent
decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). In its attempt to avoid these holdings,
the Register Guard majority attempted to differentiate real and personal property, but did so in a
manner that defied well-established tenets of property law.
No matter what various parties want the outcome in this case to be, the simple fact remains
that the Purple Communications analysis is consistent with governing law, while the Register
Guard is not. In Republic Aviation, the Court long ago recognized that employers’ real property
interests are not absolute and cannot eliminate employees’ Section 7 right to communicate about
matters of mutual aid and protection at the workplace—which stands in contrast to the opposite
approach that Lechmere requires for nonemployee communications. Republic Aviation permits
employers to implement email usage rules that serve legitimate business purposes, but employers
cannot preclude all Section 7 emails. This is true even if employees have other means to
communicate. Republic Aviation and other precedent establish that employees have a right to
engage in any form of Section 7 communications during nonwork time or in nonwork areas, as
long as no legitimate business rule is violated. Email is no different. It is merely a modern form
of the proverbial water cooler, and the NLRB should treat it as such.
In short, the NLRB should reaffirm its Purple Communications approach. It should also
extend that analysis to other forms of electronic communications. Texts and other non-email forms
of electronic communications have become popular in the workplace and should be treated on the
same footing. And that footing should be equivalent to other Section 7 communications that fall
under the Republic Aviation framework. Indeed, if there are any differences in the Board’s
governance of the various types of communications, it should provide employees greater rights to
use electronic communications, which are entitled to less protection under property law and are
almost always less intrusive than more traditional means of communication.
3

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK IS CONSISTENT WITH
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT—REGISTER GUARD IS NOT
Although email is a more recent method of communication, it is still just that: a method of

communication. As a result, this case, as well as Purple Communications and Register Guard, are
covered by well-established Supreme Court precedent. That precedent makes clear that the central
question is not the type of communication, but whether the communication is made by an employee
or a nonemployee. Because this case involves an employee communication, a Republic Aviation
analysis of the sort used in Purple Communications is required. See generally Hirsch, Worker
Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at 926-934 (discussing importance of electronic
communications to employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights); Hirsch, Communication
Breakdown, supra, at 1101-11, 1119-24 (same).
A. The Supreme Court’s Republic Aviation Holding Requires Employers to Permit
Employees to Engage in Protected Communications in the Workplace
The Supreme Court’s seminal Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)
decision directly controls this case. Both this case and Republic Aviation involve employee
attempts to engage in communications that are protected under Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157. Both this case and Republic Aviation involve employer arguments that their property
interests should trump employees’ NLRA right to communicate. Both this case and Republic
Aviation should have the same result: employer property interests cannot blindly prevent
employees’ Section 7 communications.
In Republic Aviation, the Court unambiguously held that employers’ right to control use of
their real property is not absolute. Id. at 797-98, 802 n.8. Rather, employers’ property interests
must be balanced with employees’ right to communicate under the NLRA. Id. at 803 n.10; see

4

also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978); NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322,
325 (1974) (“The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views
concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees. . . .
[B]anning [employee solicitations at work] . . . might seriously dilute [Section] 7 rights.”).
According to the Court, this balance involves a shifting presumption test that protects employees’
right to communicate with each other during appropriate times and in appropriate places, while
allowing employers to set limits when necessary to fulfill legitimate business needs. Id. at 803
n.10.
Contrary to the Register Guard majority’s statement that “employees had no statutory right
to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 matters,” 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114, the Court in
Republic Aviation was explicit in recognizing employees’ right to discuss unionization and other
Section 7 matters while using their employer’s property. 324 U.S. at 801, 803. The Court
acknowledged that employers have relevant property interests, but stressed that such interests must
often give way to employees’ Section 7 rights. Id. at 797-98, 802 n.8
Matters are very different, however, when nonemployee communications are at play. In
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), the Court held that in contrast to employees’ direct
Section 7 right to communicate, nonemployees have only an indirect right. Id. at 531-32. Thus,
employers’ property interests hold much greater sway. As a result, employers can prohibit
nonemployees from accessing the worksite to communicate with employees unless there are
“unique obstacles” to accessing employees or the exclusion is discriminatory. Id. at 535, 538, 54041. According to the Court, the key holding in Lechmere was the “distinction ‘of substance,’
between the union activities of employees and nonemployees.” Id. at 537 (quoting NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)). This holding demonstrates the error in Register

5

Guard’s conclusion that employees have no Section 7 right at all to communicate by email if they
have any other means of communications. 1 That statement is true of nonemployees, but unless the
Supreme Court reverses Lechmere and Republic Aviation, the same is not true of employees.
The combination of Lechmere and Republic Aviation establish a long-standing and clear
demarcation: the Republic Aviation analysis applies to employee communications and Lechmere
applies to nonemployee communications. In other words, employers’ property interests must
typically yield to employees’ right to communicate, but when nonemployees try to communicate
on employer property, then Section 7 generally must give way. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. at 113; Metro. Dist. Council v. NLRB, 68 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 1995); Leslie Homes, Inc., 316

1

Note that both the majority in Register Guard and the General Counsel in his brief in this case misleadingly quote
Republic Aviation to support the claim that the Supreme Court limited employees’ right to use employer’s property
only to the extent that employees’ ability to communicate would otherwise be “entirely deprived.” Register Guard,
351 N.L.R.B. at 1115 (quoting Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801 n.6); Brief for the General Counsel at 6, 11-13, Rio
All-Suites Hotel Casino, Case 28-CA-060841 (2018). The Court in Republic Aviation said nothing of the kind.
Instead, the “entirely deprived” language in Republic Aviation was a quotation from part of one of the cases under
review in which the NLRB described the facts that led it to strike down the no-solicitation rule in that case:
Thus, under the conditions obtaining in January 1943, the respondent’s employees, working long hours in a
plant engaged entirely in war production and expanding with extreme rapidity, were entirely deprived of their
normal right to “full freedom of association” in the plant on their own time, the very time and place uniquely
appropriate and almost solely available to them therefor. The respondent’s rule is therefore in clear
derogation of the rights of its employees guaranteed by the Act.
Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801 n.6 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1195 (1943). That the
Court’s holding in Republic Aviation was not limited to otherwise “entirely deprived” communications is made clear
in the same paragraph, when the Court upheld the NLRB’s Peyton Packing presumption:
. . . It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest
periods, is an employee’s time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is
on company property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule
prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property. Such
a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production
or discipline.
Id. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)); see also id. at 802 n.8 (upholding
and quoting same rule in Letourneau Co. of Georgia, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1259, 1260 (1944): “[T]he Board has held
that, while it was ‘within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation
during working hours,’ it was ‘not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property,’ the latter restriction
being deemed an unreasonable impediment to the exercise of the right to self-organization.’”); Purple
Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1062 (rejecting “entirely deprived” argument).
6

N.L.R.B. 123, 125, 129 (1995); see also UFCW v. NLRB (Oakland Mall II & Loehmann’s Plaza
II), 74 F.3d 292, 298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The error of Register Guard—or any framework that
retains its basic presumption in favor of employer property interests, including those mentioned in
the invitation for briefs in this case—is that it directly conflicts with these well-established
Supreme Court precedents. And neither the distinction between real and personal property, nor a
weak First Amendment argument, undermines that fact.
B. The Personal Property at Issue in Email Cases Strengthens Employees’ Republic
Aviation Right to Communicate
In Republic Aviation, the Court was clear in holding that an employer does not have an
unfettered right to restrict use of its real property by employees communicating about Section 7
issues. 324 U.S. at 802 (holding that “[i]nconvenience or even some dislocation of property
rights[] may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because of this precedent, Register Guard was by necessity centered
on the claim that a different rule should apply to personal property, in particular that employers
can restrict access to electronic and other personal property for any reason at all, except for
discrimination along Section 7 lines. See Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (stating that “there
is no statutory right . . . to use an employer’s equipment or media as long as the restrictions are
nondiscriminatory”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this claim violates a basic tenet of
property law.
Electronic communication systems, like other personal property, are considered “chattel.”
Under property law, an owner’s interest in chattel is inferior to an interest in real property. This
difference is illustrated by the types of proof required in trespass actions. Although a trespass
claim involving real property assumes harm in all instances of trespass, a trespass of chattel claim
requires proof that the trespass caused harm. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302-03 (Cal.
7

2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, which subjects a trespasser of chattel to
liability “only if” the chattel is dispossessed, harmed, or deprived of use for a substantial period of
time); PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS 87, 90 (5th ed. 1984)). Moreover, an individual’s unauthorized
use of another’s chattel—such as an employee’s improper use of an employer’s email system—
does not result in liability unless the use was “for a time so substantial that it is possible to estimate
the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not sufficient . . . .”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, cmt. i. Given the lower protection for personal property,
the Court’s admonition in Republic Aviation that real property must give way to employees’
Section 7 interests should, at a minimum, apply to email and other personal property.
Employee communication cases demonstrate why personal property is entitled to less
protection than real property. In cases like Republic Aviation and Lechmere, use of an employer’s
real property is a physical invasion that necessarily interferes with others’ use of the property. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435 (1982) (holding that even
minor physical invasions of property is an unconstitutional deprivation or taking of that property);
Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union
Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2000) (discussing distinction
between in-person solicitations at work and electronic solicitations). Electronic communications,
however, are not physical invasions. In addition, use of an email system will almost never interfere
with others’ use of that system. Compare Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 308 (holding that emails at issue did
not cause “any physical or functional harm or disruption” to employer’s computer system), with
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting
that massive volumes of email could burden network equipment).
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In Register Guard, the Board ignored this reality and claimed instead that employers
needed the ability to restrict employees’ email usage to preserve “server space, protect[] against
computer viruses and dissemination of confidential information, and avoid[] company liability for
employees’ inappropriate e-mails.” Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. However, neither the
Board nor the employer in that case provided any evidence that employees’ use of the employer’s
email system for Section 7 communications impaired business operations. This dearth of evidence
is unsurprising given what anyone reading this brief knows: in many workplaces, email is
ubiquitous. To be sure, the cumulative effect of a large flow of emails can impact productivity,
but despite this fact, we still do not see widespread implementation of rules imposing productivitybased limits on email usage. Cf. Jim Harter, Should Employers Ban Email After Work Hours?,
GALLUP (2014) (noting that 79% employers view employee use of email, including after work
hours, as strongly or somewhat positive);2 Amy Gallo, Stop Email Overload, HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW (2011) (arguing that email overload can be a problem, but is really a symptom of
ineffective workplace protocols). 3 And even if email overload were perceived as a bigger problem
than it is currently, Section 7 messages typically represent only a tiny portion of this overall email
flow. As a result, there is no evidence that Section 7 communications pose problems—particularly
ones more serious than those in Republic Aviation—that warrant a rule giving employers an
unfettered right to limit electronic communications. Far more defensible is a rule that permits
employers to restrict such communications only when it can show a valid business justification.
One of the ironies of Register Guard was that email is a particularly weak example of
personal property that deserves protection. An individual’s use of other types of personal property,
such as such as telephones, bulletin boards, and photocopiers, can interfere with others’ use of

2
3

Available at https://www.gallup.com/workplace/236519/employers-ban-email-work-hours.aspx.
Available at https://hbr.org/2012/02/stop-email-overload-1.
9

such property. But normal email and other electronic communications usually does not interfere
with others’ communications at all. Sending or receiving email is commonplace—indeed, it
appears to be the most common form of communication at work, see, e.g., Bob O’Donnell,
Workplace of the Future: Progress, But Slowly, Technalysis Research (2016)4 (finding that email
was top form of workplace communication, followed by telephone, texting, social media, and
instant messaging)—and almost never involves additional costs or measurable negative effects on
business operations. See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 308 (holding that unauthorized email was not a
trespass because, among other reasons, “[t]hese occasional transmissions cannot reasonably be
viewed as impairing the quality or value of [the employer’s] computer system.”). Moreover, under
Purple Communications, employers are permitted to safeguard against or remedy the rare cases
when email does impose significant costs. See Purple Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063
(“An employer may rebut the presumption [that employees can use the employer’s email] by
demonstrating that special circumstances necessary to maintain production or discipline justify
restricting its employees’ rights.”); Hirsch, Workers Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at
947, 950-951 (discussing Purple Communications’ protection of valid business concerns).
In sum, two well-established legal facts require the Board to maintain a Purple
Communications-type framework and reject that of Register Guard. First, in Republic Aviation,
the Supreme Court unequivocally held that employers’ real property must often yield to
employees’ Section 7 right to communicate.

Second, under basic property law, personal

property—like electronic communications systems—are entitled to less protection than real
property. As a result, employees’ use of email and other electronic communications for Section 7

4

Available at
http://www.technalysisresearch.com/downloads/TECHnalysis%20Research%20Workplace%20of%20the%20Future
%20Study%20Highlights.pdf.
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purposes are entitled to at least, if not more, protection than traditional communications under the
Republic Aviation framework.
C. Supreme Court Precedent and Basic Property Law Outweigh the NLRB’s
Overruled and Flawed Personal Property Precedent
As noted by the Board in Register Guard, the legal precedents described in the previous
section are countered by various NLRA cases that purport to recognize employers’ unfettered right
to restrict use of their personal property. 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (noting that this “well-settled
principle” was “[c]onsistent with a long line of cases governing employee use of employer-owned
equipment”). In Purple Communications, however, the Board properly recognized these cases for
what they really were—a convoluted game of “telephone” that were rooted solely in one line of
dicta from an administrative law judge (ALJ). See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1058-59 (dismissing most
statements as dicta and rejecting all of their applications to email cases). Such dicta is far too weak
to overcome the requirements of Republic Aviation and the basic tenets of property law.
To be sure, some decisions cited by the Board in Register Guard and others supporting its
approach include language that seems to permit employers to restrict employees’ use of email as
they see fit. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating
that an employer “unquestionably had the right to regulate and restrict” employees’ use of a
bulletin board). But such language is built upon unsupported statements in cases that originally
addressed a different issue.
Although the Sixth Circuit in Union Carbide stated that employers had an
“unquestionable” right to restrict Section 7 uses of their personal property, such a claim was only
unquestioned because neither the NLRB nor courts at that time had considered the issue in a
meaningful way. Indeed, every case the Board in Register Guard cited for this proposition failed
to substantively examine whether the NLRA allows employers to limit employees’ Section 7 use
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of employers’ personal property. 5 The sole justification for these cases’ suggestion that employers
have an unencumbered right to control their personal property is ultimately based on one sentence
by an ALJ in a case that involved a related, but different, issue.
The first decision to claim that employers can freely prevent employees from using their
employers’ personal property was, to the best of my knowledge, by an ALJ in Challenge Cook
Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 92 (1965). In that case, the ALJ stated in dicta that it “had
no doubt” that an employer that maintained a practice of preventing employees from using work
bulletin boards for personal matters could also prohibit union postings. Id. at 99. However, as the
ALJ acknowledged, Challenge Cook was not such a case because it involved instead an employer
that allowed many kinds of personal postings, but not ones related to the union. 6 All of the
subsequent cases purporting to recognize a right of employers to exclude use of their personal
property cited to Challenge Cook or its progeny.

5

Based on my review of every relevant case cited in Register Guard, and every case cited by those cases or
subsequently cited cases prior to Register Guard, there has been no substantive examination of this issue. See Johnson
Tech., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 762, 763 (2005); Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000), enforced, 269 F.3d
1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Eaton Techs., 322 N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997); Champion Int’l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109
(1991); Churchill’s Supermarket, 285 N.L.R.B. 138, 155-56 (1987) enforced 857 F.2d 1474 (6th Cir. 1988) (Table);
NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986); Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1402 (1982),
enforced, 722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Allied Stores of New York, 262 N.L.R.B. 985, 985 n.3 (1982); Union Carbide
Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981), enforced in relevant part, 714 F.2d 657, 663-664 (6th Cir. 1983); Axelson, Inc.,
257 N.L.R.B. 576 (1981); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 420 (1981); Container Corp., 244 N.L.R.B.
318, 318 n.2 (1979), enforced, 649 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Group One Broadcasting Co., W., 222
N.L.R.B. 993, 998 (1976); Vincent’s Steak House, 216 N.L.R.B. 647, 647 (1975); Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 272
(1974); Nugent Serv., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 158, 161 (1973); Heath Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1972); Tempco Mfg.
Co., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 336, 348 (1969); Challenge Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 92, 99 (1965); see
generally Hirsch, E-mail and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies, supra (describing research into NLRB personal property
precedent).
6
The ALJ stated in full the following, with no citation or other support:
I have no doubt that if the Respondent had consistently not allowed its employees to use the bulletin boards
to publicize their personal affairs, the Respondent could properly have prohibited the posting of notices of
union meetings. But that is not our set of facts. The question, I believe, is whether the Respondent, having
made its bulletin boards available to employees for posting of notices relating to social and religious affairs,
as well as meetings of charitable organizations, could validly discriminate against notices of union meetings
which employees had posted.
153 N.L.R.B. at 99.
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In addition to the lack of any meaningful analysis, this line of cases has also deviated
significantly from its origins. The earliest cases claiming an expansive rights of employers’ to
restrict the use of personal property involved claims alleging that employers had discriminatorily
restricted access to that property. See Nugent Serv., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 158, 161 (1973); Tempco
Mfg. Co., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 336, 348 (1969); Challenge Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B.
92, 99 (1965). The question of discrimination involves a very different analysis than cases
involving employees’ basic right to use employer property for Section 7 purposes. Despite this
substantial disparity, the Board cited these early discrimination cases to support the very different
conclusion that employers can always prohibit employees from using employers’ personal
property for Section 7 purposes. See Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1982), enforced, 722
F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Container Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 318 n.2 (1979), enforced, 649 F.2d 1213
(6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Register Guard, in turn, relied on these subsequent cases and their
misplaced reliance on discrimination cases.
As demonstrated, this entire line of personal property cases lack any meaningful
substantive analysis and, no doubt as a result, conflict with Supreme Court precedent and property
law. But even if these cases were on more solid ground, email and other electronic communication
systems should be treated differently. Unlike the types of personal property in those cases, use of
email almost never infringes on others’ use. Moreover, as discussed in Section III of this brief,
email and other electronic communications play a far more vital role in the workplace than do
other forms of employer personal property. See also Purple Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at
1057-58 (discussing practical differences between email and personal property with more finite
usage); Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at 926-934 (stressing value of
electronic communications to Section 7 rights). As a result, even if the NLRB were to reaffirm
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precedent addressing bulletin boards, printers, and other employer personal property, electronic
communications demand a different approach that reflect their importance to employees’ Section
7 rights.
The cases cited by Register Guard ultimately arose from these discrimination cases and
their inapposite citations. The result is a total lack of substantive justification for a rule that
abandons Republic Aviation and basic property law in order to provide employers more power to
restrict use of electronic chattel than real property. As demonstrated above, any differences
between the two types of property suggests that employers should have less—not more—authority
to restrict use of electronic communications.
II. The Purple Communications Framework is Consistent with the First Amendment
A further, constitutional-based objection to the Purple Communications framework is best
represented by Member Johnson’s dissent in that case. See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1105-07 (Johnson,
Member, dissenting); see also Brief for the General Counsel at 7-8, Rio All-Suites Hotel Casino,
Case 28-CA-060841 (2018). Among other objections, Member Johnson argued that recognizing
employees’ limited right to use employer’s email systems for Section 7 purposes violates the
First Amendment and Section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1105-07. However,
even given the Supreme Court’s recently robust view of free speech, see, e.g., Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463-65 (2018), this
argument has no merit.
The thrust of this position is that the Purple Communications framework offends the First
Amendment by requiring employers to “pay” for speech that is hostile to their positions. One
obvious problem with this assertion is that there is no evidence or reason to think that there are
any additional costs to the employer that result from Section 7 emails. Except for extraordinarily
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large or numerous messages—which employers can already prohibit under Purple
Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063-64—the marginal costs of any Section 7 email traffic does
not require an employer to pay anything more than it already does to maintain its email system.
Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (“[B]ecause the
interest on which the constitutional protection of corporate speech rests is the societal interest in
receiving information and ideas, the constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting the
presentation of other distinct views clearly identified as those of the speaker is de minimis.”); see
also Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra, at 1105, 1122–23. Moreover, contrary to Member
Johnson’s dissent, employee email under Purple Communications does not impose production
costs because that case explicitly stated that employers can limit such messaging to nonwork time.
See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063 (adopting presumption that employees have right to use employer email
for Section purposes “on nonworking time”). Finally, this cost argument not only makes little
sense as a factual matter, it also flies in the face of Republic Aviation. If allowing employee speech
on an email system during nonwork time imposes an unconstitutional “cost,” then so too would
allowing employee speech during nonwork time in an employer-maintained plant or other real
property.
Member Johnson also attempted to tie Purple Communications to the Supreme Court’s
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), decision. See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1106 (Johnson, Member,
dissenting). But neither Harris, nor the more recent Janus case, supports his position. The First
Amendment problem in those cases was a government requirement that individual employees
provide direct, financial support to union positions with which they disagree. See Janus, 138 S.Ct.
at 2463-64, Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2628–34. In contrast, Purple Communications only says that an
employer cannot normally prevent Section 7 messages from its employees’ already established use
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of workplace email. See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063. This is not a free speech issue. It is, instead, a
clear Republic Aviation situation. In both, employers’ ability to control their property—real
property in Republic Aviation and the weaker personal property in Purple Communications—is
limited by employees’ right to use that property for Section 7 purposes. In other words, if Purple
Communications violates the First Amendment and Section 8(c), then so too does Republic
Aviation.
Member Johnson also made a contradictory free speech argument centered on employee
confusion. First, he warned that use of company email will confuse employees into thinking that
their employer sent the message. Id.at 1107 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). But as virtually
anyone knows—particularly any employee in a work environment in which email is regularly
used—an email addresses’ suffix (e.g., gmail.com) has nothing to do with the identity of the
sender. The majority in Purple Communications put it succinctly: employees “would no more
think that an email message sent from a coworker via a work email account speaks for the employer
. . . than they would think that a message they receive from a friend on their personal Gmail
account speaks for Google.” Id. at 1065. This is particularly true given Member Johnson’s other
concern, the potential for messages that are hostile to the employer. Id. at 1105 (Johnson, Member,
dissenting). Assuming Member Johnson is correct about the tenor of Section 7 emails, how would
any employee mistakenly think that the employer authorized an email that is hostile to itself? It
strains credulity to think of this ever happening, much less to a degree warranting an infringement
on employees’ Section 7 rights.
Member Johnson also stressed his concern with employers being forced to subsidize speech
they do not like. Id. at 1106-07 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). As noted, there really is no subsidy
involved given the nonexistent marginal cost of most email traffic. But even if that were not true,
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the Board need not consider this issue from scratch, as the Supreme Court has already decided an
analogous case that clearly undermines Member Johnson’s concern.
At issue in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), was the FCC’s
“must carry” rule, which requires cable television channels to carry certain local broadcast stations.
See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2013). Much like the objections here, the cable companies argued
that the must carry rule unconstitutionally forced them “to transmit speech not of their choosing.”
512 U.S. at 653-56. The Court explicitly rejected that argument, holding that, despite free speech
infringements not at play with NLRB email cases, the must carry rule was constitutional. Id. at
636-37 (noting First Amendment issues related to fact that the must carry rule reduces the number
of channels that cable companies can completely control and makes it more difficult for the
companies to compete for channels). Among its justifications for upholding the must carry rule,
the Court held that the rule does not force companies “to alter their own messages” and that “there
appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a
cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.” Id. at 655.
The decision in Turner Broadcasting sends a clear message: if a cable company can be
forced to carry content of a competitor, then surely an employer can be required to allow
employees to send Section 7-protected messages as part of their pre-existing access to the
company’s email system. Cf. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the
First Amendment, 132 HARVARD L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 19) (arguing that
compelling employees and other individuals to give money does not restrict or compel speech). 7

7

Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222222.
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III.

The NLRB’s New Rule Should Apply to all Electronic Communication
Although the NLRB’s decision in Purple Communications properly balanced employers’

valid business concerns with Supreme Court precedent regarded employees Section 7 rights, it
should have extended its application to more than just email messages. The legal rationale of the
Purple Communications approach, as well as the reality of individuals’ use of electronic
communications, begs for a rule that extends beyond just emails.
Member Johnson was correct when he observed in his Purple Communications dissent that
the rationale of that decision applies to any type of employer-owned communications system. See
361 N.L.R.B. at 1079 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“By implication . . . this rationale extends
beyond email to any kind of employer communications network (be it instant messaging, internal
bulletin boards, broadcast devices, video communication or otherwise) that employees have access
to as part of their jobs.”). Republic Aviation is based on whether an employee uses employer
property to make Section 7 communications, not on the mode of such communication. See 324
U.S. at 797-98, 802 n.8. Thus, no matter whether employees send email, texts, or other types of
communication, the Republic Aviation analysis applies. As a result, the Board’s modern gloss on
Republic Aviation—either Purple Communications or another rule that respects well-established
legal precedents—should apply to all forms of electronic communications.
The reality of modern communications also demands a rule that applies to more than just
email messages.

As psychological research demonstrates, all communication is vital to

employees’ ability to engage in Section 7 collective activity.

See Hirsch, Communication

Breakdown, supra, at 1095-1101 (discussing research). Traditionally, electronic communications
have not been as effective as in-person discussions, see id. at 1107-08, but the explosion in
technology has made electronic communications an increasingly important and cost-effective
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means of employee communication. See id. at 1106, 1119; Hirsch, Silicon Bullet, supra, at 27577, 297 (noting growth of electronic communications, increased number of co-workers in different
geographic locations, and fact that electronic communications can serve as a substitute for
restrictions on unions’ and other nonemployees’ access to the workplace); William A. Herbert,
The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must be Honest, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 49, 97 (2008).
Surveys confirm this extraordinary growth in the use of electronic communications in the
United States. Although there is a dearth of current data showing the percentage of employees
who use electronic communications at work, past data and analogies to overall increases in Internet
use make the obvious point that electronic communications is an essential and growing part of
many American workplaces.
Most generally, there has been a rapid increase in the number of people going online, with
the percentage of adults in the United States who use the Internet increasing by more than 128%
over the past decade. See U.S. DEP’T

OF

COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AND

INFORMATION ADMIN., Internet Use at Work (2018) (survey showing Internet usage by individuals
15 years and older increasing from 34.7% in 1998 to 79.4% in 2017); 8 see also Pew Research
Center, Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet (2018) (survey showing Internet usage rising 71% from
2000 (52% adults use Internet) to 2018 (89% adults use Internet).9 This growth has been even
greater in the workplace, with one government survey showing an increase over the past decade
of 204%. See U.S. DEP’T

OF

COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AND INFORMATION

ADMIN., Internet Use at Work (2018) (survey showing usage of Internet at work by individuals 3

8
9

Available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=workInternetUser&disp=map.
Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
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years and older, 10 grew from 9.6% in 1998 to 29.2% in 2017);11 see also Pew Research Center,
The Web at 25 in the U.S. 19, 31-32 (2014) (describing 2014 survey results showing that, among
82% of respondents who used the Internet on a given day, 44% of them went online from work); 12
cf. 361 N.L.R.B. at 1067 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (noting importance of Facebook,
Twitter, and other social media for various types of collective action). And although email used
to be the dominant form of electronic communications, that is no longer the case. For instance, a
2017 government survey found that individuals who use the Internet employ a variety of
communication forms: 90.8% use email, 13 90.2% use texts or instant messaging,14 and 74.4% use
social networks. 15
This research demonstrates the importance of electronic communications to employee
collective action—the core right embodied in the NLRA. It also shows that such communications
are no longer limited or dominated by email. Accordingly, the NLRB should reaffirm its approach
in Purple Communications and apply it to all forms of electronic communications. Such a
reaffirmation would remain true to Supreme Court precedent and the basic right of collective action
that lies at the heart of the NLRA.

10

The age in this survey is not a typographical error. Accordingly, the data is intended to demonstrate the increase
in Internet use at work, rather than a measure of the percentage of employees who use the Internet use at work.
11
Available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=workInternetUser&disp=map.
12
Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/02/PIP_25th-anniversary-of-the-Web_0227141.pdf.
13
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMIN., Using Email (2018),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=emailUser&demo=&pc=prop&disp=chart.
14
Id., Text Messaging or Instant Messaging, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-dataexplorer#sel=textIMUser&demo=&pc=prop&disp=chart.
15
Id., Using Online Social Networks, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-dataexplorer#sel=socialNetworkUser&demo=&pc=prop&disp=chart.
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CONCLUSION
Email and similar technologies are now common, effective, inexpensive, and unobtrusive
forms of communication in modern workplaces. Employers have every right to limit employees’
use of electronic communications in the rare instances when they negatively affect legitimate
business interests. But when these special circumstances are not present, Supreme Court precedent
demands a rule that allows employees to use their pre-existing access to email and other electronic
communications for Section 7 purposes.
Employers’ property interest in electronic chattel is simply too weak—especially given the
imperceptible impact of most electronic communications—to outweigh employees’ Section 7
rights to communicate with each other at work. Indeed, employers who treat Section 7 seriously—
as opposed to those who merely want to minimize employees’ ability to exercise their rights—
should welcome the less obtrusive nature of electronic communications. Accordingly, the NLRB
should reaffirm the general approach of Purple Communications and extend it to all electronic
communications.
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